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I. Importance of Methods Awareness
Fikentscher is a proponent of awareness of legal methods:
Methods Awareness. He contrasts his Methods Awareness to the
Methods Relativism of Ernst Rabel.1 For Rabel, comparison of
methods, was not, as Fikentscher puts it, in the program.2 Rabel
preferred to emphasize the similarities among legal systems; he
observed how different systems often reach similar solutions.3
Rabel, Fikentscher notes, espoused Methods Relativism in the 1920s
when political events threatened to isolate Germany from its former wartime enemies. It was a time to stress similarities in approaches.4
*J.D.,

LL.M., Dr. Jur. (under Fikentscher). This reprint of the article provides
German terminology and quotations from German sources as English translations in the text. All translations are the author’s, except as otherwise noted.
Translated German terms are in italics. The version as published gives German
quotes in the text and provides English translations in the footnotes. The published page numbers are inserted in the text as star pages.
1
See Methoden des Rechts in vergleichender Darstellung (hereafter
“Methoden”), 1975-1977, vol. 1, p. 10-13.
2 Id.
3 W. Fikentscher, Gedanken zu einer rechtsvergleichenden Methodenlehre, in:
Recht im Wandel, Festschrift Hundertfünfzig Jahre Carl Heymanns Verlag, 1965,
141, reprinted in: Methoden, vol. 5, 693, 696.
4 Methoden, vol. 1, pp. 12-13.
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When, in the 1950s, Fikentscher went to the United States
to study American law, he was in the vanguard of what has become a massive pilgrimage of European and especially of German
jurists to the “Bologna” of our day.5 In the decade after the Second
World War, Rabel’s reasons for [*115] Methodenrelativismus must
have still seemed strong to Fikentscher at the University of Michigan, where Rabel himself found refuge.6 Only a few years before,
the first contingent of German legal interns to study in the United
States received a somewhat frosty, if understandable, reception as
it was held by some suspect for Germany’s recent Nazi past. That
group still showed psychological and physical effects of the War.7
Fikentscher acknowledges that Methods Relativism stood him in
good stead in his studies in Ann Arbor. If an answer in American
law failed him, he could reach for the answer in German law, and
chances were good they were the same.8 So why should
Fikentscher later endorse Methods Awareness?
Jurists work with their legal methods often without thinking about them at all. Karl Llewellyn observed of American common law jurists that “Handling precedents is a matter of tradecraft, an art one learns from experience. … One learns this from
study, from the practice of law, in general from life as a lawyer.
But little thought is given to what one is learning.”9 When an experienced jurist goes abroad to study another legal system, this
lack of Methods Awareness can be dangerous. It is all too easy to
substitute for one’s lack of knowledge of the foreign system the
knowledge that one already has of one’s own.10 Yet different legal
See R. Stürner, Die Rezeption U.S.-amerikanischen Rechts in der
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in Festschrift für Kurt Rebmann, 1989, p. 839 and
W. Wiegand, The Reception of American Law in Europe, 39 Am. J. Comp. L. 229
(1991).
6 See Großfeld/Winship, The Law Professor Refugee, 18 Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Cmm.
3 (1992).
7 See M. Rheinstein, The German Referendar Training Program at the University
of Chicago Law School, 3 J. Legal Ed. 273 (1950), reprinted in: M. Rheinstein, Gesammelte Schriften, 1979, vol. 1, 310.
8 Methoden, vol. 2, p. 467 n. 55.
9 K.N. Llewellyn, Präjudizienrecht und Rechtsprechung in Amerika, 1933, p. 2.
Translated as The Case Law System in America, M. Ansaldi, transl., 1989, p. 2.
10 See J. Maxeiner, Die Gefahr der Übertragung deutschen Rechtsdenkens auf den
US-amerikanischen Zivilprozeßrecht, RIW 1990, 440.
5
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methods may produce very different results even with very similar substantive law.11 Fikentscher has put the problem succinctly:
one needs to know what the legal system can deliver.12
[*116] The jurist studying foreign law should begin by
studying legal methods. The foreign jurist ought to learn what it
means to think like a jurist in the foreign system.13 But a jurist
studying foreign law usually has a particular area of law that he
or she is anxious to learn about. It is the rare jurist who has the
time and interest to tackle the foreign system qua system. The jurist who wants to focus on legal methods in foreign law study is
apt to encounter frustration. Both in the United States and in
Germany, legal methods are largely taught interstitially in substantive law courses and in extra-university professional settings
rather than in university courses denominated legal methods. I
probably learned more about German legal methods attending
Judge Günther Schmitz’s14 Interns’ Course at the District Court in
Munich than in any course at the university. The first year courses
in which legal methods are imparted are just too slow and timeconsuming for established jurists. In the United States, it is the
rare LL.M. program that directs foreign students toward general
courses that might provide training in legal methods and away
from more-specialized courses such as international business law.
The purpose of this contribution is to help develop Methods
Awareness in German jurists unfamiliar with American law. I hope
to do this by showing how distant from German understanding
present-day American practice is. I proceed from Fikentscher’s
thumbnail sketch of German Prevailing Teaching: “this method
starts from norm-thinking, therefore thinks in rules, that are applied to the case at hand.”15 I refer to the core elements of this
teaching, namely the place of the legal norm (Rechtssatz) in the legal
order (Rechtsordnung) and its application to a particular set of facts
(i.e., subsumption), and discuss the significance of these concepts
See, e.g., J. Maxeiner, Policy and Methods in German and American Antitrust
Law: A Comparative Study, 1986.
12 Methoden, vol. 1, p. 13.
13 See W. Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (I), 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1889, 1896
(1995).
14 Now retired Judge of the Bavarian Constitutional Court.
15 Methoden, vol. 3, p. 638 (emphasis in original).
11
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in American law. I leave unaddressed certain other key elements
of Methods Theory, such as differences between case law and statute law, which are much discussed elsewhere in the literature.16
[*117]
II. Legal order
For German jurists, there exists an abstract legal order that
governs all behavior. “The legal order is a structure of oughtnorms. The idea of their message is not to describe facts, but to
prescribe conduct.”17 This objective order is contrasted to subjective rights of individual subjects. Fikentscher observes at the outset of his Methoden: The expression “objective right” designates
the legal order that applies to all. In contrast to that one terms subjective right that right that pertains to an individual against another or to an object.”18 The legal order forms a unity.19 The norms
are interrelated. Taken together they form a system.20 While it
may be that the ideal cannot be realized, nevertheless the goal is a
system organized as if a single plan governed. Different laws
should mesh with each other: none should command contrary action. Norm Variance (Normspaltung) should be avoided.21

Fikentscher in his headings in Chapter 29 of Methoden, vol. 3, identifies several different elements to Methodenlehre: Rechtsordnung und Rechtssatz (legal order
and legal norm); Auslegung der Rechtssätze (interpretation of legal norms); Rechtsfortbildung (development of law); and Rechtsanwendung, including die syllogistische Lehre von der Subsumption (application of law, i.e., the syllogistic teaching
of subsumption).
17 R. Zippellius, Einführung in die juristische Methodenlehre, 3d ed., 1980, p. 12
(“The legal order is a structure of ought-norms. The idea of their message is not
to describe facts, but to prescribe conduct.”)
18 Methoden, vol. 1, p. 1. Compare K. Engisch, Einführung in das juristische Denken, 7th ed., 1977, p. 24 (“Legal usage distinguishes between Objective Right and
Subjective Right. Objective Right is the legal order, the aggregate of legal rules,
the norms, that a few moments ago we formulated as imperatives. Subject Right
is an entitlement (Berechtigung).”
19 See K. Engisch, Die Einheit der Rechtsordnung, 1935, reprint 1987.
20 See C. Canaris, Systemdenken und Systembegriff in der Jurisprudenz, 1969.
21 P. Raisch, Juristische Methoden vom antiken Rom bis zur Gegenwart, 1995, pp.
148-49.
16
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Legal order is a term little used in the United States.22 But
the ideal expressed by it—that the law is a rational, complete and
logical system of rules—was at one time fairly common. In the
1930s John Dickenson described it as “customary”. He felt that the
ideal of a complete and logical system of legal rules had survived
largely out of habit in legal analysis rather than through conscious
belief.23 Although a customary view, Ame [*118] rican jurists have
been skeptical of the ideal of law as an internally consistent system of rules.24 James Herget describes how Oliver Wendell
Holmes, Jr. rejected the German-inspired “Austinian strictures of
an autonomous system of logically interrelated rules.”25 Roscoe
Pound likewise rejected one version as an ideal drawn from Byzantine Roman law: “We must,” he said, “hasten to repudiate a
conception of law as an aggregate of rules, i.e., of precepts attaching definite detailed legal consequences to definite detailed states
of fact.”26 Today, one would be hard pressed to find supporters of
the ideal of a legal order in the German sense.27 Indeed, the
American legal scene has proponents of a virtually opposite view.
The Critical Legal Studies movement is skeptical of the very possibility of any kind of rule-governed regime.28
That American jurists have been skeptical of a legal order
as a consistent set of rules is not surprising given the diversity of
sources of American law. The ideal of a legislator laying down
rules based on a single plan is pretty hard to square with the
American legal system where large areas of the law are left to inSee J. Herget, Contemporary German Legal Philosophy, 1996, p. 117.
J. Dickenson, Legal Rules: Their Function in the Process of Decision, 79 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 833, 834 (1931). Edward Levi, for example, while denying that the legal
process is the application of known rules to diverse facts, nonetheless states “Yet
it is a system of rules.” E. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 1949, p. 3.
24 See R.S. Summers, Instrumentalism and American Legal Theory, 1982, pp. 13839.
25 J. Herget, American Jurisprudence, 1870-1970: A History, 1990, pp. 39, 41.
26 The Future of American Law, Lecture delivered at The Catholic University of
America School of Law, May 31, 1946, in: Fryer/Benson, Cases and Materials on
Legal Method, 1949, pp. 64, 68.
27 Compare Atiyah/Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American Law, 1987,
p. 72 (“Leading legal theorists … have even claimed that a legal system is essentially or in large measure a system of rules.”).
28 See M. Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies, 1987, p. 45.
22
23
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dependent control by fifty different states. American lawyers live
with a lack of system that would be unthinkable in Germany. To
be sure, Germany is also a federal system, but in Germany large
areas of law that would be governed in the United States by a
multiplicity of state laws are governed by unitary federal law, e.g.,
most of private law, criminal law, and procedure.29 Of course, not
all in the United States is legal chaos. Measures are taken to make
laws consistent with each other: sometimes federal law preempts
a field, sometimes uniform state laws govern, and sometimes state
and federal courts in common law adjudication follow private
compilations such as the Restatements of the Law. But these mea
[*119] sures are designed not so much to achieve a goal of one
consistent system, as to avoid the collapse of completely conflicting systems.30
The German ideal of legal order faces another obstacle in
the United States. The ideal is essentially legislative, but American
skills with legislation are “primitive.”31 Although most American
jurists would agree that statutes are the predominant legal sources
of our time,32 the United States has never developed an effective
technique to deal with them. American statutes start with the
handicap that America is generally hostile to any kind of law,
whether legislative or judge-made.33 Americans like to contrast
their own free market, independent system to the European regulatory state. But worse still, American jurists have “no intelligible
theory” on how to deal with legislation.34 They have allowed
statutory interpretation theory to lie in “conceptual desuetude.”35
As a result, American legislation is rarely comprehensive or sys29 Query whether the German ideal of legal order can survive the European Union.
30 See D. Currie, Die Vereinheitlichung des amerikanischen Privatrechts, JZ, 1996,
930, 931 (“a uniform law [is] not always desirable”).
31 M.A. Glendon, Comment, p. 95, in A. Gutmann, A Matter of Interpretation:
Federal Courts and the Law: An Essay by Antonin Scalia with Commentary,
1997.
32 Id. pp. 95, 97 (quoting a Harvard Law School Curriculum Report). G. Calabresi
in A Common Law for the Age of Statutes, 1982, p. 1, speaks of the “statutorification” of American law.
33 See Methoden, vol. 2, pp. 7, 463.
34 A. Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation, in A. Gutman, supra, p. 14.
35 W. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 1994, p. 1.
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tematic. American statutes often resemble case law in that they
may only resolve specific narrow points in controversy.
Indeed, system, whether achieved through legislation, judicial decision or legal writing, does not figure prominently in the
program of the casuistic American legal world. Pound observed
that “if one doubts it, he has only to compare a modern institutional book on the Roman law, a modern elementary textbook of
French law or a modern introduction to the German code with the
conventional Anglo-American textbook of elementary law to see
that we have no true system of the common law, much less a system of law that actually governs.36 Today more than ever, American jurists have turned their attention away from formulating
general rules. Even systematic treatises are largely a thing of the
past.37 According to the Scottish jurist Alan Watson, “To an extent
unparalleled elsewhere, [American] [* 119] students are not exposed to systematic treatment of law, with clear-cut concepts, institutions, and rules, but are presented with individual cases, outside of a historical, doctrinal, legal context but against a background of social interests.”38 The point is not lost on the German
student in America: “One soon learns that the legal system largely
does without ordering structures.”39
III. Rule skepticism and legal process
1. Fixation on legal process
The ideal of the legal order as a system of consistent rules
never had much of a chance in modern America. For most of this
century there has been a widespread skepticism of legal rules altogether. Nearly a half century ago, the classic work on legal
method in the United States, stated succinctly: “[I]t cannot be said
that the legal process is the application of known rules to diverse
36 R. Pound, Taught Law, in: Report of the Thirty-Fifth Annual Meeting of the
American Bar Association, 1912, pp. 975, 981.
37 See M.A. Glendon, A Nation Under Lawyers, 1993, pp. 204-06.
38 A. Watson, Joseph Story and the Comity of Errors, A Case Study in Conflict of
Laws, 1992, p. 118 n. 29.
39 H.J. Meyer, Ein Studienjahr an der Harvard Law School, JZ, 1987, 713, 714.
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facts.”40 In his Introduction to Legal Reasoning, Edward Levi called
that view a pretense: “It is important that the mechanism of legal
reasoning should not be concealed by its pretense. The pretense is
that the law is a system of known rules applied by a judge; the
pretense has long been under attack.”41 The “pretense” fell when
American jurists determined that common law judges make rather
than simply apply law. Their attention focused on the process of
law creation.
An English observer, H.L.A. Hart, commented that American thought about the general nature of law “is marked by a concentration, almost to the point of obsession, on the judicial process, that is with what courts do and should do, how judges reason
and should reason in deciding particular cases.”42 Indeed, American jurists are more likely to talk about legal pro [*121] cess43 than
legal order.44 Process-thinking places emphasis on how decisions
are reached rather than on the abstract question, what is the law.
For a long time there has been a position represented in American
legal thinking that what matters is what the judges do about an
issue, not what is the law (the “predictive” theory45). Already in
1872 Holmes wrote: “it is not the will of the sovereign that makes
lawyers’ law, even when that is its source … The only question for
the lawyer is, how will the judges act?”46 Later, in his more famous aphorism, he observed: “The prophecies of what the courts
will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by

E. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning, 1949, p. 3.
Id. p. 1.
42 American Jurisprudence through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble
Dream, 11 Ga. L. Rev. 1169 (1977), reprinted in: H.L.A. Hart, Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy, 1983, p. 123.
43 See, e.g., Hart/Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of law, 1994, tent. ed., 1958.
44 Fikentscher notes that Anglo-American legal thinking focuses on procedure
and dealing with legal problems, that is, on methods, whereas ContinentalEuropean treatment of legal questions is concerned with finding the immediately
just solution, that is, its focus is in legal philosophy. Methoden, vol. 2, p. 3.
45 See R.S. Summers, chap. 5, supra, pp. 116-35.
46 Book Notice, 6 American Law Review 723 (1872), reprinted in: F. Kellogg, The
Formative Essays of Justice Holmes: The Making of an American Legal Philosophy, 1984, p. 92.
40
41
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the law.”47 John Chipman Gray stressed the point: “whoever hath
an absolute authority not only to interpret the Law, but to say
what the Law is, is truly the Law-giver.”48
The Legal Realists of the 1930s focused on the political and
social considerations that in their view underlie judicial decisions.
Judges can and do make law, they proclaimed. Emphasis on the
creative function of judges, however, led to what H.L.A. Hart
called a “Nightmare” version of law in the United States:
The Nightmare is this. Litigants in law cases consider themselves entitled to have from judges an
application of the existing law to their disputes, not
to have new law made for them. Of course it is accepted that what the existing law is need not be
and very often is not obvious, and the trained expertise of the lawyer may be needed to extract it
from the appropriate sources. But for conventional
thought, the image of the judge, to use the phrase
of an eminent English judge, Lord Radcliffe, is that
of the ‘objective, impartial, erudite, and experience
declarer of the law’, not to be confused with the
very different image of the legislator.49
[*122] Hart was not just talking in the dark. Much of American
legal theory—indeed, even much of American legal practice—
tends to support at least a mild version of the Hart Nightmare.
P.S. Atiyah and Robert Summers consider one characteristic of the
American legal system to be the “open modification of the rule to
allow purposes or policies to be taken into account.”50 Again, the
47 The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457 (1897), reprints: Collected Legal Papers, 1921, p. 167, 173 and S. Novick (ed.), The Collected Works of Justice Holmes,
1994, vol. 3.
48 J.C. Gray, The Nature and Sources of the Law, 2d ed., 1921, reprint 1972, p. 102.
49 American Jurisprudence through English Eyes: The Nightmare and the Noble
Dream, 11 Ga. L. Rev. 1169, 1172 (1977), reprinted in H.L.A. Hart: Essays in Jurisprudence and Philosophy 123, 126 (1983).
50 Atiyah/Summers p. 91. Roscoe Pound advocated an “equitable application of
the law” which conceived of the legal rule “as a general guide to the judge, leading him toward the just result, but insist[ing] that within wide limits he should
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point is not lost on the German student in America: “in large
measure determining the law is necessarily result-oriented.”51
Fikentscher puts a positive spin on the predominant American
treatment of rules: “The program is not rule antagonism, but
flexibility of rules and adaptability of the system in order to meet
… the need of the hour.”52
Hart could accept that sometimes American judges would
be involved in law making, but he found surprising that “the
Nightmare view should be presented by serious American jurists
not merely as a feature of certain types of difficult adjudication …
but as if adjudication were essentially a form of law-making [and]
never a matter of declaring existing law ….”53 Since Hart wrote
this critique, the Nightmare has become more vivid. The Critical
Legal Studies movement has argued that all law is politics and
that there is no such thing as separate legal analysis. Duncan Kennedy writes that “Teachers teach nonsense when they persuade
students that legal reasoning is distinct, as a method for reaching
correct results, from ethical and political discourse in general (i.e.,
from policy analysis). … There is never a “correct legal solution”
that is other than the correct ethical and political solution to that
legal problem.”54 The Critical Legal Studies movement attacks the
very idea of the rule of law (i.e., “… that government in all its actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand—[*123]
rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how the
authority will use its coercive powers in given circumstances and

be free to deal with the individual case, so as to meet the demands of justice between the parties and accord with the general reason of ordinary men.” The
Scope and Purpose of Sociological Jurisprudence III, 25 Harv. L. Rev. 489, 515
(1912).
51 Meyer, supra, p. 714.
52 Methoden, vol. 2, p. 465.
53 Id. p. 973, Essays pp. 127-28.
54 D. Kennedy, Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy 47, in D. Kairys (ed.),
The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique, 1982, p. 40.
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one’s individual affairs on the basis of this knowledge”55). The
rule of law is but a myth.56
2. Mainstream acceptance of rule skepticism
Will the Critical Legal Studies movement carry the day?
Will American jurists accept the idea that all law is politics? Will
the majority reject the ideal of the rule of law?57 Probably not. Yet,
just how far the American legal world has gone toward accepting,
at least in principle, Hart’s Nightmare view is suggested by observations of a number of mainstream scholars. Summers notes that
many American lawyers regard “the purported neutral application of rules [as] a sham.”58 Richard Posner says that it is Hart’s
England that has departed from the common law tradition by
emphasizing law as rules, by viewing the judge as primarily an
applier of rules laid down by legislatures, and by seeking to separate law from politics.”59 Mary Ann Glendon says that “the
American legal profession lacks even a minimal consensus that
judges, practitioners, and scholars have roles and responsibilities
to which personal interests and predilections must be subordinated ….”60 “[S]ubjective forms of judging in which neither text
nor precedent is accorded much respect seem in [*124] creasingly
55 F.A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, 1944 edition with a new Preface from 1976,
p. 72. According to Neil MacCormick, there is no material difference between the
concepts of the rule of law and of the Rechtsstaat. N. MacCormick, Der
Rechtsstaat und die rule of law, JZ 1984, 65.
56 See A. Altman, Critical Legal Studies, A Liberal Critique, 1990. The CLS attack
on the rule of law would strike German scholars as “something threatening,
dangerous or, indeed, nihilistic.” A. Somek, From Kennedy to Balkin: Introducing
Critical Legal Studies from a Continental Perspective, 42 Kan. L. Rev. 759, 765
(1994). Compare Methoden, vol. 2, p. 170: “It is recognizbale in Holmes as in no
other legal thinker how immediately in the end “Problem-Openness“ (Problemoffenheit) leads to nihilism.”
57 See F. Mootz, Rethinking the Rule of Law: A Demonstration that Obvious is
Plausible, 61 Tenn. R. Rev. 69, 71 (1993).
58 Atiyah/Summers p. 91.
59 R. Posner, Law and Legal Theory in England and America, 1996, p. 20 (arguing
that English law now has a “Continental Character”) . But see Methoden, vol. 2,
p. 152 (arguing that American methods are closer to Continental French and
German methods than are English methods).
60 M.A. Glendon, Comment, p. 112.
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to be accepted as legitimate.”61 Subjectives Recht is understood in
America; Objectives Recht may not be.
That many mainstream American jurists are skeptical of
rules may be attributed to the low level of abstraction and sophistication of rules in American law generally. The American approach to rules frequently is an either/or proposition: either the
rule is detailed and strict or the rule is no more than a grant of uncontrolled discretion. As a result of the former, there are many
areas in American law where there are “legitimate departures
from rules,” e.g., “jury nullification” (where juries are permitted to
decide against the law) and “prosecutorial discretion” (where
prosecutors are permitted to decide when to enforce laws).62 Perhaps because American rules are so unsatisfactory, some American jurists tend to see deficiencies in American rules as typical of
all rules. They are unfamiliar with more sophisticated systems of
rules and systems of granting and controlling discretion as are
well-known to German jurists.63 Some American legal scholars
seek to present these departures from rules as if they were in fact
virtues rather than vices in the American legal system which permit decision makers to take into account individual circumstances
that would be insufficiently appreciated by rule-bound decisions.64
Id. p. 110.
C.R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict, 1996, pp. 148, 153.
63 American theorizing about law is extremely self-centered. Rarely do legal
scholars examine approaches outside the Anglo-American world. Only occasionally is this restricted view recognized as a limitation on the ability to generalize.
See, e.g., Altman, p. 104. See generally J. Langbein, The Influence of Comparative
Procedure in the United States, 43 Am. J. Comp. L. 545, 551 (1995);
Stiefel/Maxeiner, Why are U.S. Lawyers not Learning from Comparative Law?,
Festschrift für Bär & Karrer, 1997.
64 See, e.g., Kadish/Kadish, Discretion to Disobey: A Study of Lawful Departures
from Legal Rules (1973); C.R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict,
1996, substantially incorporating C.R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 Calif. L.
Rev. 953 (1995) (“One of my principal goals in this Article is to respond to a pervasive social phenomenon: extravagant enthusiasm for rules and an extravagantly rule-bound conception of the rule of law.”); F. Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47
Stan. L. Rev. 633, 634 (1995) (“at times it is better not to give reasons than to give
them”); G. Calabresi, supra, p. 180 (“One should recognize openly that courts are
exercising the power to allocate legislative inertia and to decide whether statutes
deserve a retentionist or a revisionist bias.”).
61
62
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[*125]
IV. Application of law
1. Relationstechnik
In their Internship time German jurists train to act as judges
to apply law to facts. They learn the skill of drafting a judgment,
the so-called Relationship Technique (Relationstechnik) or Judgment
Technique (Urteilstechnik). Foreign jurists learning German law are
advised: “A German judgment is supposed to appear as an act of
an impartial as well as impersonal public authority furnishing the
official and objective interpretation rather than being based on the
personal opinions of the deciding justices. … The typical German
judgment, like its French counterpart, strives after the ideal of deductive reasoning.”65 The two principal substantive parts of the
judgment are the Tatbestand and the Entscheidungsgründe. The Tatbestand is a short statement of the parties’ legal claims and assertions of fact.66 It is to include everything that is legally relevant to
the decision, everything that might be legally relevant to the decision, and everything that a party might think is legally relevant to
the decision. Yet, it is to be as short and as colorless as possible.
From the Tatbestand, it should be possible to determine quickly
who is seeking what, from whom, on what ground and to determine which matters are in dispute and which are not.67 The
Entscheidungsgründe is a summary of the considerations for the
decision.68 It is to evaluate and subsume the concrete facts of the
Tatbestand under the abstract elements of the applicable norm.69
Similarly, it is to be as sparing with words as possible. It is to state
a conclusion and justify it, rather than to develop a position and
argue to a decision. That which fails to support the decision, has

65 R. Zimmermann, An Introduction to German Legal Culture, in Ebke/Finkin
(eds.), Introduction to German Law 1, 21 (1996).
66 ZPO § 313 II; E. Schneider, Der Zivilrechtsfall in Prüfung und Praxis, 6th ed.,
1974, p. 186.
67 E. Schneider, p. 185.
68 ZPO § 313 III.
69 Schmitz/Ernemann/Frisch, Die Station in Zivilsachen, 1986, 90.
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no place.70 They Entscheidungsgründe is to find facts, not by simply
stating which evidence was believed, but to evaluate the evidence
and say why it was believed.71
[*126] The highly-stylized German judgment is designed to
assure that the parties understand the grounds for the court’s decision.72 Ideally the judgment will convince the party losing the
lawsuit that that loss is the correct outcome.73 At a minimum, the
judgment should persuade the loser that the process was rational.
“The party affected by the judgment should be enabled to rationally reproduce the grounds for the decision. He should recognize,
that not arbitrariness, but rational argumentation determined the
judgment, that use was made of practical reason (Kant).”74 In this
way the parties are guaranteed the constitutional right to equal
treatment under the law (GG Article 3) and to the right to be
heard (rechtliches Gehör, GG Article 103(1)).75 The judgment also
controls the judge.76 If the judge fails to subsume the facts of the
case under the applicable law properly, the judge’s decision is
subject to correction on appeal. The judgment demonstrates
whether the judge understood the losing party’s position; through
its impersonal and colorless nature, it demonstrates the judge’s
neutrality.77
Although training in the Relationship Technique is designed
for judges, the technique is pervasive in the German legal world.
All German jurists of whatever function are trained in it and utilize it as a matter of second nature. Administrators draft decisions
that resemble judgments. Lawyers use the Relationship Technique to
evaluate clients’ positions.

Thomas/Putzo, Zivilprozeßordnung, 10th ed. 1978, § 313, p. 574.
E. Schneider, p. 204.
72 Baumbach/Lauterbach/Albers/Hartmann, Zivilprozeßordnung, 53d ed., 1995,
§ 313, margin no. 33.
73 K. Schellhammer, Die Arbeitsmethode des Zivilrichters, 7th ed., 1984, p. 242.
74 P. Raisch, Juristische Methoden vom antiken Rom bis zur Gegenwart, 1995, p.
121.
75 Baumbach/Lauterbach/Albers/Hartmann, Zivilprozeßordnung, 53d ed., 1995,
§ 313, margin no. 33.
76 Schellhammer p. 242; Schmitz/Ernemann/Frisch p. 83.
77 E. Schneider, pp. 178-79.
70
71
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2. Application of law in America
Fikentscher puts it bluntly “that there is no American
teaching of subsumption of facts under a norm is, is because no
memorandum (“Gutachten”) and judgment technique has been
[*127] developed.”78 Far from developing a theory that subsumes
facts under law, Anglo-American civil procedure, that is, that
branch of the legal system where law is necessarily applied to
facts, is concerned with separating law from facts. The purpose of
this separation is to permit two different decision-makers to decide two different kinds of questions, namely judges to decide
questions of law and lay juries to decide questions of fact. This
distinction has been important for so-called common law courts,
which used juries, but had less importance for equity courts, which
did not.
Although American law did not develop a subsumption
theory, it did have another mechanism that gave form to the application of substantive law: the system of common law pleading.
Common law procedure was highly formularly. A party seeking
relief had to bring his or her claim under one of a limited number
of “forms of action.” Through the system of pleading, that is,
through the exchange of statements regarding the case, the parties
in theory reached a single point in dispute, either a legal one, for
the judge to determine, or a factual one, for the lay jury to decide.
In effect, the parties applied the law to the facts and agreed upon
the point to be decided. Pleading served “to develop and present
the precise point in dispute upon the record itself, without requiring any action of the part of the Court for the purpose.”79 The legal
Methoden, vol. 2, p. 262. He attributes this to an absence of a theory that covers
both case law and statute law. Case law results from decision of concrete disputes between parties. By its nature, it focuses on the substantive claims in the
individual cases. Statute law, on the other hand, partakes more of the form of a
command and is, therefore, more formalistic. See Atiyah/Summers, p. 96 (“an inherently more formal type of law”).
79 S. Tyler, The First Report of the Commissioners Appointed by the General Assembly of Maryland to Revise, Simplify and Abridge The Rules of Practice,
Pleadings, &c. In the Courts of the State, 1855, p. 10. This is a spirited defense of
“special pleading” against the civil law system and against equity procedure.
The Report stresses: “The Pleadings shall be so conducted as to evolve upon the record,
by the effect of the allegations themselves, the questions of law and of fact disputed be78
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issue might be whether the conduct claimed fell under the requirements of the selected form of action. The factual issue might
be whether the particular fact required by a form of action had
occurred.
In the second half of the nineteenth century, America
abandoned the common law system of pleading. It adopted new
procedures that had more [*128] in common with procedure in the
courts of equity.80 One goal of this reform was to make dispute
resolution less formal. But one result was to strip away what form
there had been that had guided the proceedings. This the relatively formless equity procedures which were adopted, were in
large measure implemented by lay juries rather than professional
judges. These juries no longer were limited, however, to deciding
one or two points in dispute. They had to consider the whole case.
One of the few limiting factors on their decision that remains, at
least to some extent, is the concept of “cause of action,” which requires parties to prove a group of facts that give rise to a claim for
relief.81 While the idea of a cause of action containing distinct elements bears similarity to the German idea of Tatbestand and Tatbestand elements, in practice, however, the two concepts are far
apart.
In theory, in modern American litigation, the judge determines the legal rules, while the jury finds the facts and applies the
legal rules to these facts.82 The judge thus is the law-giver and not
the law-applier. Some American judges seem to like it that way
for it permits them to make policy.83 The judge gives the law in a
variety of ways: at trial, at the conclusion of the parties’ presentations, when the judge instructs the jury in what the law is that the
tween the parties, and present them as the subject matter agreed upon for decision.” P.
109. Compare O. Hartwieg, Die Kunst des Sachvortrags im Zivilprozeß: Eine
rechtsvergleichende Studie zur Arbeitsweise des englischen Pleading-Systems,
1988.
80 See generally S.N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. Pa. L. Rev. 909 (1987).
81 See F. James, Civil Procedure, 1965, § 2.9, p. 76.
82 See Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 167 F.2d 54, 60-61, 64 n. 25b.
(2d Cir. 1948) (Jerome Frank, J.).
83 See Posner, supra, p. 34-35 and C. Wyzanski, Whereas—A Judge’s Premises,
1965, p. 6.
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jury is to apply to the facts; earlier in the case when the judge on
motion determines that the allegations of the complaint are legally
insufficient to state a particular “cause of action” (motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim), or holds that the facts as discovered by the parties in “pre-trial” discovery can not support a claim
(motion for summary judgment); during trial, when the judge determines that evidence presented is irrelevant or immaterial to the
cause of action at hand; and after the trial when the judge, on motion, gives decides that there is no legally sufficient evidentiary
basis for a reasonable jury to find on an issue for a party (judgment as a matter of law). It is this creative function in law-giving
that has so fascinated legal scholars around the world.
In theory, the jury finds the facts and applies the law to the
facts, after the parties have tried the case and the judge has instructed the jury in the applicable law. In theory, it should evaluate the parties’ evidence and de [*129] termine whether the party
seeking relief has established each and every element of each and
every cause of action raised. The reality is, however, almost certainly quite different. It begs credulity to think that a group of
laymen, never educated in the law, is able to grasp complicated
instructions given them in the law and apply that law unassisted.
Juries often do not comprehend the elements of causes of action
and just decide for the party they favor.84 Nor have American
judges made the task any easier for juries. At the same time as
America abandoned the issue narrowing of common law pleading, it also largely stopped the English practice of judges commenting on the evidence. That is, judges no longer express their
views as to how they would apply the law to the facts of the case
as disclosed at trial.85
In any event, how a given jury actually does apply law to
facts in a give case is unknown. The jury’s verdict is “general,”
that is, it is merely a statement of decision. The German equivalent would be a judgment that consisted solely of the formal state84 See Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., supra; C. May, Perspectives on
Judicial Speech: “What Do We Do Now?”: Helping Juries Apply the Instructions,
28 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 869 (1995) (with copious further references).
85 See S. Saltzburg, The Unnecessarily Expanding Role of the American Trial
Judge, 64 Va. L. Rev. 1, 22 (1978).
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ment of the judgment (Urteilsformel). The jury’s decision is, as
Jerome Frank put it, “as inscrutable and essentially mysterious as
the judgment which issued from the ancient oracle of Delphi.”86
Because of the general nature of the verdict, errors in determination of facts, understanding law of, or application of law to facts
largely can not be determined87 and usually can not be corrected
on appeal. American appeals do not consider whether the decision of the lower court was correct, but whether the procedure
followed there was proper and whether the law was properly
stated. In German understanding, America has Revision (appeal
on the law) but no Berufung (appeal on the facts). The German
student would well remember a recent television program’s
comment on the American system: “If the American jury system
promises anything, it is not a fair outcome, only a fair process.”88
It is readily apparent why the American system places
such great weight on values related to the fairness of the process,
namely, whether the parties were given fair notice of the proceedings, whether judge and the jury were completely neutral and unprejudiced, and whether the parties had a [*129] full, fair and ample opportunity to present their views of the case. These factors
legitimate the proceeding. They are all that the system can assure;
the system cannot assure the correctness of the decision. While
this approach to legitimating resolution of conflicts is defensible, it
makes for a legal method that is, at best, awkward in a modern,
mass society.
3. American law application in other areas of life
Most applications of law occur in daily life without intervention of judge or jury.89 The myopic approach of American jurists to consideration of legal methods, largely limited as it has
been to judicial decision-making, has slighted all other venues in

Skidmore v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 167 F.2d 54, 60.
Id. 61.
88 Schlesinger/Bradley, CBS Reports: Enter the Jury Room, first broadcast April 16,
1997 (transcript and video tape available).
89 See R. Summers pp. 220-22.
86
87
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which law is applied90 and has led to pernicious effects for society
generally.
When evaluating a legal position outside the courtroom,
one generally still needs to bear in mind the potential impact inside the courtroom or other forum empowered to enforce the law.
If the system for enforcing the law is irrational and unpredictable,
as the American system often is, no matter how clear or how
wholesome the substantive law is, the legal situation may be unsatisfactory. It should not be surprising that it is in America that
the classic phrase expressing the dichotomy of “Law In Books and
Law in Action” was first coined.91 Parties evaluating potential
conduct then need to consider not only that the irrational system
might defeat their meritorious claims, but also that parties with
frivolous claims may seek to use the legal system to damage them
without legal justification. Learning to spot issues is an important
aspect of American legal education and the ability to theorize
about how facts should give rise to a legal remedy even though no
such cause of action presently exists is considered an important
talent for a lawyer.92 The mere threat of litigation can be enough to
cause someone to back off, because litigation is extremely expensive and its costs [*131] are largely determined by the parties in
the lawsuit. Those costs, moreover, are borne by each party and
are not assessed against the losing party. Consequently, Americans seek to so conduct their lives as to avoid litigation as much as
they can. For example, they structure contracts so as to avoid creating possible issues for courts to consider and, above all, to avoid
issues of fact.93

90 Pound criticized the Anglo-American analytical theory’s definition of law as a
body of precepts enforced in judicial tribunals for ignoring the role of law as
anything but a rule of decision, and therefore for ignoring the administrative
element in the legal order in action. R. Pound, Nineteenth Century Theories of
Judicial Finding of Law, 36 Harv. L. Rev. 802, 810 (1923), reprinted in Association
of the Bar of the City of New York, Lectures on Legal Topics, vol. 4 (1922-1923),
1928, pp. 93, 127.
91 R. Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 Am. L. Rev. 12 (1910).
92 T. Disare, A Lawyer’s Education, 7 Md. J. Contemp. L. Issues 359, 370-71 (1996).
93 See J. Langbein, Comparative Civil Procedure and the Style of Complex Contracts, 35 Am. J. Comp. L. 381 (1987), in German, ZVglRWiss, vol. 86, 1987, 141.
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When applying the law outside a courtroom setting, one
still needs to be able to legitimate the decision. The litigation
model offers only one way to legitimate decisions: a full and fair
hearing before a neutral body. But this method of proceeding is
extremely expensive and practically foreclosed in many areas of
daily life that nonetheless require kind of control. The justified
judgment-like decision of a German administrator provides an
alternative legitimization mechanism unavailable to American
administrators. In the United States, such reasoned decisionmaking would likely be attacked as not fitting within the American model, because it combines the role of judge and prosecutor in
one. With such a handicap, however, it is no wonder that American jurists have yet to develop an effective system of granting and
controlling discretion.
V. Conclusion
German jurists who are familiar with American legal
methods will think along the lines of their American counterparts.
They will recognize that legal questions in the United States
should be analyzed with awareness of the legal methods used to
apply the law. They will see that they need to consider all of the
parties potentially concerned with the law. They will understand
that they should consider not just how the parties immediately
affected by the law may act, but also how other parties in society—including lay jury members and judicial and administrative
authorities—might react to action based on that law. They will see
that legal rights may in theory exist that in practice cannot be enforced. At the same time, however, they will note that weak
claims may be stronger than the law would seem to permit. They
will better understand that in American law—and probably in
their own law as well—that law is more than just the black letter
rules. Above all, they will have a better feeling for the complexity
of law as a means of governing social interaction.

